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NOTE
UNFAIR COLLECTION: RECLAIMING CONTROL OF
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE PERSONAL INFORMATION FROM
DATA SCRAPERS
Andrew M. Parks*
Rising enthusiasm for consumer data protection in the United States has resulted in several states advancing legislation to protect the privacy of their residents’ personal information. But even the newly enacted California Privacy
Rights Act (CPRA)—the most comprehensive data privacy law in the country—leaves a wide-open gap for internet data scrapers to extract, share, and
monetize consumers’ personal information while circumventing regulation.
Allowing scrapers to evade privacy regulations comes with potentially disastrous consequences for individuals and society at large.
This Note argues that even publicly available personal information should be
protected from bulk collection and misappropriation by data scrapers. California should reform its privacy legislation to align with the European Union’s
General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR), which requires data scrapers to
provide notice to data subjects upon the collection of their personal information regardless of its public availability. This reform could lay the groundwork for future legislation at the federal level.
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INTRODUCTION
In January 2021, a software engineer in New York City scoured dozens of
city and state websites attempting to schedule a COVID-19 vaccination for his
mother. 1 At that time, there was no uniform system for scheduling vaccination appointments. The city and state appointment systems were completely
different, each with its own sign-up protocol. 2 Frustrated with this convoluted
system, the engineer decided to develop a solution. In less than two weeks, he
launched TurboVax, “a free website that compiles availability from the three
main city and state New York vaccine systems and sends the information in
real time to Twitter.” 3 Because vaccine appointment information was publicly
available on the internet, TurboVax could access this information using a
computer program called a “bot.” This bot automatically checked, copied, and
republished appointment data in bulk, avoiding the need to manually check
1. Sharon Otterman, N.Y.’s Vaccine Websites Weren’t Working. He Built a New One for
$50., N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/09/nyregion/vaccine-website-appointment-nyc.html [perma.cc/3THW-EU4J].
2. Id.; see also Ron Lieber, How to Get the Coronavirus Vaccine in New York City, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/nyc-vaccine-shot.html [perma.cc/Z9CLQDWM].
3. Otterman, supra note 1; see also @turbovax, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/turbovax
[perma.cc/UF4R-Y94J].
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government websites for available slots. 4 The process that TurboVax used to
extract vast amounts of data from the internet is called “scraping.” 5
It’s one thing to scrape the internet for publicly available information
when the content extracted is not associated with an individual’s personal information, but quite another when it is. When a LinkedIn user creates a public
profile to search for employment, she may well include her phone number,
email address, and a photo of her face. Although this information is technically “public,” she might reasonably expect this information to remain personal to her and within her control. She may, for instance, list her LinkedIn
profile publicly while searching for a job but later set it to “private” after securing employment. Yet all her personal data—her name, phone number,
email address, and photo—were, at least for some time, made public and
therefore susceptible to extraction and reappropriation by scrapers. 6 And this
bell cannot be unrung. 7
Over the past few years, consumer data privacy legislation has surfaced
across the United States. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) 8 and
the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA), 9 for instance, now regulate the collection of consumer personal data and the sharing of such data with third parties. But no currently proposed or enacted privacy statute adequately protects
publicly available personal information. 10 All of it is exempted, making it fair
game to be scraped, used, shared, or sold. Many scholars have written about
data scraping and its legality under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 11

4. Email from Huge Ma, Dev., TurboVax, to author (Feb. 10, 2021, 6:27 PM) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (confirming that TurboVax uses scraping technology to replicate
communication between a user’s browser and server if one were to look up vaccination appointment availability); see also Frequently Asked Questions, TURBOVAX, https://www.turbovax.info/faq [perma.cc/A66Z-JDNN]; Dana Schulz, This Website Wants to Centralize Vaccine
Appointments for the Entire Country, 6SQFT (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.6sqft.com/vaccinefinder-covid-vaccination-appointments-national-website [perma.cc/DYA4-3TD4].
5. See Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years of Web Scraping and the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 372, 381–82 (2018); Marissa Boulanger, Case Note, Scraping the
Bottom of the Barrel: Why It Is No Surprise That Data Scrapers Can Have Access to Public Profiles
on LinkedIn, 21 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2018).
6. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated,
141 S. Ct. 2752 (2021) (finding scraping personal data did not violate the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act where the website scraped was public and not password protected).
7. Alexander Tsesis, Data Subjects’ Privacy Rights: Regulation of Personal Data Retention
and Erasure, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 593, 600 (2019) (“Once a person reveals details about such
things as personal location, shopping habits, sexuality, sex, education, travel plans, and an infinite number of similarly revealing data points, the subject becomes almost powerless to demand
that social media companies purge all collected and tracked information.”).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.198 (West Supp. 2021) (amended 2020).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199.95 (West Supp. 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
10. See infra Section II.B.
11. See Sellars, supra note 5; Boulanger, supra note 5; Jacquellena Carrero, Note, Access
Granted: A First Amendment Theory of Reform of the CFAA Access Provision, 120 COLUM. L.
REV. 131 (2020); Tess Macapinlac, Note, The Legality of Web Scraping: A Proposal, 71 FED.
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Others have discussed various consumer data privacy statutes and proposals
across the United States and Europe. 12 But few have addressed the privacy implications of scraping publicly available personal information, 13 and no one
has proposed a reform to regulate such activity in the United States. This Note
does just that.
Part I of this Note defines data scraping, explains its purposes, and summarizes its current legality. Part II argues that publicly available personal information should be protected from data scrapers, analyzes the current
landscape of state and federal consumer data privacy legislation, and explains
why existing and proposed solutions are inadequate to address this issue. It
also describes how publicly available personal information is handled by the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Part III argues that while passing legislation at the federal level could be desirable, California ought to amend its privacy laws to incorporate GDPR-style protections
for publicly available personal information. Specifically, California should
regulate the collection of publicly available personal information based on
whether the information collected can be anonymized, whether the information is collected in bulk, and whether the information is collected for commercial purposes.
I.

DATA SCRAPING AND ITS CURRENT LEGALITY

To understand the privacy implications of data scraping, it is necessary to
explain its function and legality. Scraping has many useful applications, and it
is often employed by individuals serving the public interest. Unfortunately,
scraping can also be used for malicious purposes, and businesses frequently
attempt to block or deter parties from scraping their websites. As such, Part I
concludes by examining the most common legal claims available to address
scraping.

COMMC’NS L.J. 399 (2019); Jennie E. Christensen, Note, The Demise of the CFAA in Data Scraping Cases, 34 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 529 (2020); Zachary Gold & Mark Latonero,
Robots Welcome? Ethical and Legal Considerations for Web Crawling and Scraping, 13 WASH.
J.L. TECH. & ARTS 275 (2018); Amber Zamora, Making Room for Big Data: Web Scraping and an
Affirmative Right to Access Publicly Available Information Online, 12 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP
& L. 203 (2019).
12. See Stuart L. Pardau, The California Consumer Privacy Act: Towards a European-Style
Privacy Regime in the United States?, 23 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 68 (2018); Alexandria J. Saquella,
Comment, Personal Data Vulnerability: Constitutional Issues with the California Consumer Privacy Act, 60 JURIMETRICS 215 (2020); Joanna Kessler, Note, Data Protection in the Wake of the
GDPR: California’s Solution for Protecting “The World’s Most Valuable Resource,” 93 S. CAL. L.
REV. 99 (2019); Jordan Yallen, Comment, Untangling the Privacy Law Web: Why the California
Consumer Privacy Act Furthers the Need for Federal Preemptive Legislation, 53 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
787 (2020); W. Gregory Voss & Kimberly A. Houser, Personal Data and the GDPR: Providing a
Competitive Advantage for U.S. Companies, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 287 (2019).
13. See Geoffrey Xiao, Note, Bad Bots: Regulating the Scraping of Public Personal Information, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 702 (2021).
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A. Scraping: Definition, Usage, and Purposes
Data scraping is the process of scanning and extracting large amounts of
data from one or more websites using a software program often referred to as
a “bot,” “robot,” or “scraper.” 14 Scraping is different from “hacking,” which
involves breaking into another person’s “computer, network, servers, or database,” 15 typically by cracking a password or exploiting a vulnerability in the
website’s code. 16 Scrapers, by contrast, extract publicly available data 17 and
thus have no need to break into private servers.
Scraping has many beneficial purposes. It can be used to preserve websites, conduct research, compare product and price information from various
sources, gather contact and social media data for outreach campaigns, track
company reputation, and aggregate news and other content on curated websites. 18 Journalists use scraping technology to gather and analyze massive
chunks of statistical data. 19 Scholars employ scraping technology to aid their
academic research. 20 Advertisers use scraping technology to collect contact
details and public posts on social media websites to better market their products to consumers. 21
Although scraping has beneficial applications, scraping technology can
also be used for malicious purposes, such as spamming email accounts, causing website crashes, 22 or conducting scams. 23 Exemplifying morally questionable use of data scraping technology is the company Clearview AI. 24 Clearview
14. See Boulanger, supra note 5, at 77–78; Sellars, supra note 5, at 381–82. Additionally,
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “screen-scraping” as “[t]he practice of extracting data directly
from one website and displaying it on another website.” Screen-Scraping, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). To avoid confusion, this Note’s use of “scraping technology” refers
to the bots used to scrape content from the internet, and its use of “scrapers” refers to the individuals or entities employing scraping technology. Notably, though, others often also use “scrapers” to refer to the bots used for scraping.
15. Hack, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
16. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1644–45 (2003).
17. See Macapinlac, supra note 11, at 401–02.
18. Sellars, supra note 5, at 374; Michael Keating, Understanding the History of Web
Scraping, OCTATOOLS (Feb. 24, 2016), https://octatools.com/understanding-history-web-scraping [perma.cc/K8JX-GCHH].
19. Keating, supra note 18.
20. For instance, in Sandvig v. Sessions, four professors sought a declaratory judgment
that scraping for research purposes did not violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 315 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 8–10 (D.D.C. 2018).
21. See Keating, supra note 18.
22. Boulanger, supra note 5, at 78.
23. See Kevin Collier, Why Cybercriminals Looking to Steal Personal Info Are Using Text
Messages as Bait, NBC NEWS (May 6, 2021, 9:44 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/scam-text-messages-are-rampant-no-easy-fix-rcna840 [perma.cc/2VZQ-WLZ5].
24. See Sam duPont, On Facial Recognition, the U.S. Isn’t China—Yet, LAWFARE (June
18, 2020, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facial-recognition-us-isnt-china-yet [perma.cc
/2X4C-63HB].
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scrapes billions of personal images posted on Facebook and other websites for
use in its facial recognition software. 25 It then sells its software to law enforcement agencies, allowing police departments to “compare a face captured on a
security camera against [Clearview’s] database to reveal possible matches.” 26
No user consents to Clearview’s collection, and even if the image is later removed from the public site, Clearview keeps a copy. 27 Significantly, cease-anddesist letters from Google, YouTube, Venmo, and LinkedIn have failed to stop
Clearview from scraping. 28 Clearview has ignored the letters and maintains
that it has a First Amendment right to access publicly available information.29
Clearview’s facial recognition software has been used by thousands of law enforcement agencies, companies, and individuals around the world. 30
Scraping technology is also deployed problematically in the “mugshot industry.” 31 In this industry, private companies use bots to scrape booking photos of arrested persons from publicly accessible law enforcement websites. The
companies then display the photos in “mugshot galleries” on their websites. 32
Scraping enables the companies to monetize the mugshots in various ways,
such as hosting advertisements on their websites, charging visitors a fee to
search their mugshot database, and—most controversially—charging subjects

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Google, YouTube, Venmo and LinkedIn Send Cease-and-Desist Letters to Facial
Recognition App That Helps Law Enforcement, CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020, 6:52 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/clearview-ai-google-youtube-send-cease-and-desist-letter-to-facial-recognition-app [perma.cc/4JGW-2HW2].
28. Id.
29. Id.; Katelyn Ringrose & Divya Ramjee, Watch Where You Walk: Law Enforcement
Surveillance and Protester Privacy, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 349, 361 (2020).
30. Ryan Mac, Caroline Haskins & Logan McDonald, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App
Has Been Used by the Justice Department, ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, and the NBA, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Feb. 27, 2020, 11:37 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-iceglobal-law-enforcement [perma.cc/W228-5GU9]. A June 2021 report by the Government Accountability Office revealed that Clearview’s facial recognition software was used by at least
ten federal government agencies, including Customs and Border Protection, ICE, the FBI, and
the Secret Service. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-518, FACIAL RECOGNITION
TECHNOLOGY: FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES SHOULD BETTER ASSESS PRIVACY AND
OTHER RISKS 12 (2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-518.pdf [perma.cc/273T-MNDB].
31. See Eumi K. Lee, Monetizing Shame: Mugshots, Privacy, and the Right to Access, 70
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 557, 566–69 (2018).
32. Id. at 563, 566; see also Allen Rostron, Commentary, The Mugshot Industry: Freedom
of Speech, Rights of Publicity, and the Controversy Sparked by an Unusual New Type of Business,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1321, 1323–24 (2013).
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large fees to have their mugshots removed. 33 Even if an arrested person’s criminal record is expunged, their scraped mugshot can appear in Google search
results and be dispersed across dozens of websites. 34
To prevent scraping, website owners often prohibit the practice in their
website’s terms of service 35 or implement technological barriers. One such
barrier is the installation of a “robots.txt” file—a widely used protocol that instructs specified bots to ignore certain files when crawling or scraping a website—to their website’s root directory. 36 However, these technological barriers
do not always effectively deter scraping. And as Section I.B will explain, the
most common legal barriers to scraping do little to deter scraping publicly
available personal information.
B. The Current Legal Landscape of Data Scraping
In the United States, litigation that responds to data scraping typically involves the following claims: (1) Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
claims for scraping data “without authorization” or “exceed[ing] authorized
access”; (2) state and federal copyright-infringement claims; and (3) common
law trespass-to-chattels and breach-of-contract claims. 37 While scholars have
written extensively about whether these causes of action effectively deter or prevent scraping in general, 38 this Section instead focuses specifically on the failure of these causes of action to protect publicly available personal information.
1.

Claims Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) imposes liability on anyone
who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access[] and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected
computer.”39 In hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., a data company used bots to

33. Rostron, supra note 32, at 1324–25; see also Lee, supra note 31, at 568 (describing
“reputation management” companies that charge fees ranging from the low hundreds up to
thousands of dollars to remove mugshot images from the internet).
34. Sarah Esther Lageson, There’s No Such Thing as Expunging a Criminal Record Anymore, SLATE (Jan. 7, 2019, 2:44 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/01/criminal-record-expungement-internet-due-process.html [perma.cc/7LAX-3AUE].
35. Christensen, supra note 11, at 533 (“Companies often attempt to limit scraping of
their data through their website’s terms and conditions.”); see also Sw. Airlines Co. v. Roundpipe,
LLC, 375 F. Supp. 3d 687, 690 (N.D. Tex. 2019).
36. Sellars, supra note 5, at 413–14.
37. Zamora, supra note 11, at 205, 210.
38. See, e.g., Boulanger, supra note 5, at 78–81; Zamora, supra note 11, at 210–24; Christensen, supra note 11, at 531–35; Kathleen C. Riley, Note, Data Scraping as a Cause of Action:
Limiting Use of the CFAA and Trespass in Online Copying Cases, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 265–279 (2018); Han-Wei Liu, Two Decades of Laws and Practice Around
Screen Scraping in the Common Law World and Its Open Banking Watershed Moment, 30 WASH.
INT’L L.J. 28, 32–44 (2020).
39. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
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scrape information that LinkedIn users included on their public profiles, such
as their name, job title, work history, and skills. 40 The Ninth Circuit found that
this scraping did not violate the CFAA even though LinkedIn prohibits users
from scraping its website in its terms of service and employs technological
barriers to block scraping. 41 Instead, the court held that scraping only triggers
liability under the CFAA when a website is private or password protected and
a user circumvents this barrier to scrape data anyway. 42 LinkedIn then filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 43
While LinkedIn’s petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided Van
Buren v. United States, its first case interpreting the CFAA. 44 In Van Buren,
the Court considered whether a police officer who accessed a computer for an
improper purpose “exceed[ed] authorized access” in violation of the CFAA. 45
Holding that accessing a computer for an improper purpose does not violate
the CFAA, the Court adopted a “gates-up-or-down” approach: a person violates the CFAA by bypassing a “gate” that is down that the person is not supposed to bypass. 46 In other words, a person needs to enter “particular areas of
the computer—such as files, folders, or databases—that are off limits to him”
for liability to follow. 47
After issuing this ruling, the Supreme Court granted LinkedIn’s petition
for writ of certiorari in hiQ Labs. 48 Upon review, the Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
the Court’s ruling in Van Buren. 49 But applying Van Buren’s “gates-up-ordown” inquiry to hiQ Labs will probably not change its outcome. The data
scraped on LinkedIn’s website were publicly accessible and not protected by a
password. The “gates,” therefore, were not down. As such, a person who
scrapes data from a publicly accessible website likely does not violate the
CFAA because that person has not bypassed a “gate” barring access to publicly
available data.

40. 938 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2752 (2021).
41. See id. at 1001–03.
42. Id. at 1001 (“[A]uthorization is only required for password-protected sites or sites that
otherwise prevent the general public from viewing the information.”).
43. See Zarish Baig & Kristin L. Bryan, hiQ LinkedIn Data Scraping CFAA Ruling Delayed
Pending SCOTUS Decision, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/hiq-linkedin-data-scraping-cfaa-ruling-delayed-pending-scotus-decision [perma.cc/NHX3UPKT].
44. 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021).
45. Id. at 1662.
46. Id. at 1658–59 (“[O]ne either can or cannot access a computer system, and one either
can or cannot access certain areas within the system.”).
47. Id. at 1662; see also Orin Kerr, The Supreme Court Reins In the CFAA in Van Buren,
LAWFARE (June 9, 2021, 9:04 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-reins-cfaavan-buren [perma.cc/ADE3-ZREZ].
48. LinkedIn Corp. v. hiQ Labs, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 2752 (2021).
49. Id.
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In Sandvig v. Sessions, the plaintiffs argued that researchers’ use of datascraping tools constituted access “without authorization” in violation of the
CFAA. 50 Because the data sought were publicly available, the court stated that
“[e]mploying a bot to crawl a website . . . may run afoul of a website’s [terms
of service], but it does not constitute an access violation when the human who
creates the bot is otherwise allowed to read and interact with that site.” 51 Given
these rulings, it is unlikely that the CFAA presents any meaningful barrier to
scraping publicly available personal data.
2.

Copyright Infringement, Trespass to Chattels, and Breach of Contract
Claims

Like claims brought under the CFAA, claims of copyright infringement,
breach of contract, and trespass to chattels are unlikely to protect individuals’
publicly available personal information from scrapers. First, when the data includes personal information—for example, an individual’s name, address,
email address, phone number, geolocation data, or internet browsing history—courts tend to find that the scraping does not constitute copyright infringement because facts are not copyrightable. 52 Copyright law distinguishes
noncopyrightable facts from copyrightable works of authorship that are independently created by the author and possess at least a minimal degree of creativity. 53 One district court has held that scraping data from Southwest
Airlines’ website did not constitute copyright infringement because “[f]are,
route and scheduling information are all facts and thus not copyrightable.” 54
Personal data similarly are facts, not works of authorship, suggesting that copyright law cannot serve as a remedy for this kind of data scraping.
Second, scraping could constitute trespass to chattels—intentional interference with another’s personal property55—if the bots used for scraping impede the website owner’s ability to use portions of its servers. 56 These claims
may provide an effective method for website owners to deter scrapers from
impermissibly collecting data from their websites. 57 But because most individ-

50. 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8–10 (D.D.C. 2018).
51. Sandvig, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 27.
52. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–48 (1991).
53. See id. at 344–51.
54. Sw. Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437, 440–41 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
55. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
56. See, e.g., Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 980–81 (N.D. Cal. 2013);
eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069–70; Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404–05 (2d Cir.
2004).
57. See, e.g., Craigslist, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 966–67, 980 (suggesting that scraping could
constitute trespass to chattels where defendant continued scraping despite cease-and-desist letters and where defendant’s unauthorized interference allegedly “reduce[d plaintiff]’s capacity to
service its users because it occupie[d] and use[d plaintiff]’s resources”); eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at
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uals are not website owners and do not host their own data, they have no trespass to chattels claim to bring against scrapers who trespass upon or impede
access to web servers.
Finally, data scraping may constitute breach of contract when a website’s
terms of service expressly prohibit scraping and users scrape data anyway. 58
The enforceability of an antiscraping provision in a website’s terms of service
often depends on whether the agreement required the scraper to affirmatively
manifest assent to its terms. 59 Even if it did, the terms ordinarily bind only the
parties to the agreement—the website owner and the scraper. Thus, such
agreements would not necessarily create any cause of action for individuals
whose personal information is scraped from a website. 60
II.

THE DATA SCRAPING LOOPHOLE

Part II of this Note argues that, where an individual’s personal information is concerned, scraping of even publicly available personal information
should be regulated. While there are existing state and federal consumer data
privacy laws in the United States, data scraping circumvents these proposed
solutions, rendering them inadequate to address this issue. In contrast, the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides a
more robust model for amending the American legal framework on data privacy.
A. Publicly Available Personal Information Should Be Protected
Even when the information is publicly available, scraping personal information is problematic. In the absence of statutory and other legal protections
for personal information, courts have held that scraping personal information
is permissible so long as the information is publicly accessible. 61 But personal
information may be made public for various reasons, often without the

1060–62, 1070–72 (finding plaintiff likely to prevail on its trespass claim where defendant’s
scraping may have diminished the quality of plaintiff’s computer systems and bandwidth).
58. Christensen, supra note 11, at 533.
59. See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175–79 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding
an agreement unenforceable because its terms were buried in a hyperlink in the bottom corner
of the website and the site “provide[d] no notice to users nor prompt[ed] them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent”). But see Verio, 356 F.3d at 403 (finding that scraper
assented to website’s terms by accessing the website despite not clicking a button specifically
agreeing to the website’s terms).
60. But see QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d 576, 588 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (holding
that website owner was a third-party beneficiary of an agreement between a scraper and defendant where defendant permitted the scraper to “transmit malicious and unsolicited software . . . [and] us[e] a device, program, or robot” against the plaintiff’s website (alterations in
original)).
61. See, e.g., hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2752 (2021); Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2018);
Sandvig v. Barr, 451 F. Supp. 3d 73, 86–89 (D.D.C. 2020).
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knowledge or consent of the subject. 62 And even when a subject voluntarily
makes her information public, she likely does so without meaningful consent
and without considering the potentially damaging implications of such a decision, both for herself and society at large.
1.

Information Made Public Without the Subject’s Knowledge or Consent

In many cases, an individual never knows that their personal information
has been made public, making it impossible for them to consent to its publication. Some personal information is made public through lawful government
public records. For example, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) website
publicly displays federal political campaign contributions. These data include
each contributor’s full name, mailing address, occupation, employer, and contribution amount. 63 Yet individuals probably do not realize they are publicly
disclosing all of this personally identifiable information when they donate to
a campaign.
An individual’s personal information might also be made public when a
third party publishes it online without their consent. This sometimes takes the
form of “doxing”—a kind of cyber harassment involving “the public release of
personal information that can be used to identify or locate an individual.” 64
Finally, personal information might also be made public as a result of a
data breach. 65 Hackers frequently sell databases of stolen data records from
businesses on the dark web for large sums of money. 66 If businesses delay or
choose not to disclose the cyber breach to consumers, the consumers may
never know their information was hacked and potentially made public. 67

62. For example, information may be made public when an individual is “doxed.” See
Alexander J. Lindvall, Political Hacktivism: Doxing & the First Amendment, 53 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1, 2 (2019).
63. See, e.g., Receipts, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts
[perma.cc/3SUE-RZWL] (recording personal information of campaign donors, including full
name, mailing address, employer, occupation, date of contribution, and contribution amount).
64. Julia M. MacAllister, Note, The Doxing Dilemma: Seeking a Remedy for the Malicious
Publication of Personal Information, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2453 (2017); Lindvall, supra
note 62, at 2.
65. For example, Equifax suffered a data breach in 2017 that may have compromised the
sensitive information of 143 million American consumers. Tara Siegel Bernard, Tiffany Hsu, Nicole
Perlroth & Ron Lieber, Equifax Says Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-cyberattack.html
[perma.cc/B2Y2-Z9BK].
66. See Davey Winder, Hacker Gives Away 386 Million Stolen Records on Dark Web—
What You Need to Do Now, FORBES (July 29, 2020, 5:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2020/07/29/hacker-gives-away-386-million-stolen-records-on-dark-web-what-you-needto-do-now-shinyhunters-data-breach [perma.cc/5DSM-2ZSV].
67. See Renae Merle, Yahoo Fined $35 Million for Failing to Disclose Cyber Breach, WASH.
POST (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/04/24/yahoofined-35-million-for-failing-to-disclose-cyber-breach [perma.cc/CDB7-UD2V].
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Some have argued that personal data should be treated like property,
owned and controlled by the individual. 68 Although current U.S. law does not
recognize any definitive right of ownership to data, 69 users nevertheless might
naively believe that they control theirs. After all, they can control whether to
set their social profiles to “public” or “private,” and they decide whether to
hide or archive content previously posted publicly. That an individual’s personal information has been published publicly on the internet should not automatically grant internet data scrapers carte blanche authority to extract,
reappropriate, or monetize it. Personal information is just that: personal.
2.

Information Made Public Voluntarily Should Still Be Protected

Even when an individual voluntarily makes her information public, she
still retains a privacy interest in controlling it. A dissent penned by Justice
Gorsuch in a different legal context—government collection of personal information from third parties for criminal investigations—provides helpful insights:
[T]he fact that a third party has access to or possession of your papers and
effects does not necessarily eliminate your interest in them. Ever hand a private document to a friend to be returned? Toss your keys to a valet at a restaurant? Ask your neighbor to look after your dog while you travel? You
would not expect the friend to share the document with others; the valet to
lend your car to his buddy; or the neighbor to put Fido up for adoption. 70

This reasoning can be extended. For example, just because a user posts
her home address on a publicly available website does not eliminate her interest in later preserving the privacy of that information. She may have made the
post public only temporarily. She may have accidentally posted it publicly
when she intended it to be private. Or she may have posted it to her private
profile—specifically electing to make the information viewable only by a select
group of friends on her account—and yet one of those friends with access may
have reposted or redistributed her information publicly. In each of these scenarios, her interest in preserving the privacy of her personal information
should not be completely eliminated merely because it wound up publicly accessible at least for some time.
Unless a user affirmatively changes her privacy settings on the websites
and social media platforms to which she gives her data, third parties can probably access her information. Most social networking platforms make users’

68. See Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for
Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220, 223 (2018) (“This article offers a bold proposition: An explicit, legal mechanism to establish, claim and transfer property rights in data must
be adopted.”); will.i.am, We Need to Own Our Data as a Human Right—and Be Compensated for
It, ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.economist.com/open-future/2019/01/21/we-needto-own-our-data-as-a-human-right-and-be-compensated-for-it [perma.cc/X336-LKCR].
69. See Ritter & Mayer, supra note 68, at 251.
70. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2268 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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content publicly accessible by default. 71 But even if a prudent person were to
set her profile to “private” to hide her personal information from public view,
data scrapers might still be able to access it. 72 And on non-social media websites that limit access to those with login credentials, a scraper would only need
to sign up for an account to gain access. 73 LinkedIn’s privacy policy warns:
Please do not post or add personal data to your profile that you would not
want to be publicly available. . . . Your profile is fully visible to all Members
and customers of our Services. Subject to your settings, it can also be visible
to others on or off of our Services (e.g., Visitors to our Services or users of
third-party search engines). 74

Still, if a website includes a warning about data scraping, studies suggest
users are unlikely to take heed. A 2017 survey of two thousand U.S. consumers
found that 91 percent of people consent to terms of service without reading
them. 75 For those aged 18 to 34, the rate was 97 percent. 76 In light of these
statistics, it would be imprudent to conclude that the average user realizes that
she has knowingly consented to scraping by bots if she accidentally posts a
photo of herself publicly on Instagram. 77
3.

The Dangers of Allowing the Scraping of Personal Information in Bulk

What flows from scrapers’ ability to extract individuals’ publicly available
personal data is alarming. At its most innocuous, data scraping permits third

71. See, e.g., About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com
/en/safety-and-security/public-and-protected-tweets [perma.cc/UNL3-HHVU].
72. Twitter’s privacy pages contemplate such a scenario: “Protected Tweets [are o]nly visible to your Twitter followers. Please keep in mind, your followers may still capture images of
your Tweets and share them.” Id.
73. See Sandvig v. Barr, 451 F. Supp. 3d 73, 89, 92 (D.D.C. 2020).
74. Privacy Policy, LINKEDIN (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacypolicy [perma.cc/9YGH-L9LM].
75. Jessica Guynn, What You Need to Know Before Clicking ‘I Agree’ on That Terms of
Service Agreement or Privacy Policy, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2020, 2:21 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2020/01/28/not-reading-the-small-print-is-privacy-policy-fail/4565274002
[perma.cc/CGN9-BWF5].
76. Id.
77. Such a lack of knowledge or consent is exacerbated when considering the number of
young social media users. For example, of TikTok’s forty-nine million daily users in the United
States, more than a third are fourteen years old or younger. Raymond Zhong & Sheera Frenkel,
A Third of TikTok’s U.S. Users May Be 14 or Under, Raising Safety Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/14/technology/tiktok-underage-users-ftc.html
[perma.cc/4B49-HW6E]. Federal law nominally prevents website operators from collecting certain data from children. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C.
§ 6502. However, many children on the internet lie about their age. Mark Sweney, More Than 80%
of Children Lie About Their Age to Use Sites like Facebook, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2013, 7:01 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/jul/26/children-lie-age-facebook-asa [perma.cc/Y9LTWJ2J].
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parties to monetize our personal information without our knowledge or consent. At its most dangerous, it has the potential to vastly restrict liberty, undermine democracy, and even put people in physical danger.
The following examples highlight the very different but equally dangerous
consequences of data scraping. In February 2019, an African American man
named Nijeer Parks was falsely accused of shoplifting and attempting to hit a
police officer with a car outside a motel in Woodbridge, New Jersey. 78 He
spent ten days in jail and paid around $5,000 to defend his case. 79 Parks’s arrest stemmed from facial recognition software misidentifying him. 80 Parks
later sued the city’s police department, alleging that it used facial recognition
software from Clearview AI. 81 While it is still unclear whether Clearview AI
was used in his apprehension, 82 the mass scraping of publicly available personal data can lead to misidentification resulting in false arrests, jail time, and
thousands of dollars in attorney fees. 83
78. Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recognitionmisidentify-jail.html [perma.cc/5WQD-55WX].
79. Id.
80. Id. Indeed, a study published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
found empirical evidence showing that most facial recognition software programs exhibit racial
bias, producing higher rates of false positives for Asian and African American faces compared
to images of Caucasian faces. PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L INST.
OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART
3: DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS 2–3 (2019), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8280; Catherine Thorbecke, After Federal Study Finds Racial Bias in Facial Recognition Tech, Advocates Renew Calls
for Ban, ABC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2019, 2:31 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/federal-studyfinds-racial-bias-facial-recognition-tech/story?id=67853261 [perma.cc/UK9R-J7J6]; see also Elaisha Stokes, Wrongful Arrest Exposes Racial Bias in Facial Recognition Technology, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 19, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/detroit-facial-recognition-surveillance-camera-racial-bias-crime [perma.cc/LM67-4A73].
81. Complaint at ¶ 29, Parks v. McCormack, No. 2:21-cv-04021-MCA-LDW (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. Nov. 25, 2020); Hill, supra note 78; see also supra notes 24–30 and accompanying
text. It should be noted that in 2020, New Jersey’s attorney general barred police officers in the
state from using the Clearview AI app. Kashmir Hill, New Jersey Bars Police from Using Clearview
Facial Recognition App, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/technology/clearview-ai-new-jersey.html [perma.cc/R7NZ-4VM2]. And in February 2021, Canada
determined that Clearview AI’s scraping of biometric information violated Canada’s privacy
laws. Kashmir Hill, Clearview AI’s Facial Recognition App Called Illegal in Canada, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/03/technology/clearview-ai-illegal-canada.html
[perma.cc/3XZ6-Z4P6].
82. Curiously, Parks’s amended complaint dropped any mention of Clearview AI. See
Second Amended Complaint, Parks v. McCormack, No. 2:21-cv-04021-MCA-LDW (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. June 1, 2021).
83. See Kristin L. Bryan & Christina Lamoureux, Government Users of Facial Recognition
Software Sued by Plaintiff Alleging Wrongful Imprisonment over Case of Mistaken Identity, NAT’L
L. REV. (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/government-users-facial-recognition-software-sued-plaintiff-alleging-wrongful [perma.cc/R5DN-ECX2]; Stokes, supra note 80
(discussing fallout of false arrest based on erroneous match in facial recognition software); Drew
Harwell, Wrongfully Arrested Man Sues Detroit Police over False Facial Recognition Match,
WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2021, 4:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021
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Mass scraping of personal information creates dangers that go beyond
mere loss of privacy; it also enables cybercrime. In April 2021, Insider reported
that personal data, ranging from phone numbers to locations, of over 533 million Facebook users were scraped and leaked in hacking forums. 84 Facebook
confirmed that “malicious actors obtained this data not through hacking [Facebook’s] systems but by scraping it.” 85 Alon Gal, the chief technology officer
of the cybercrime intelligence firm Hudson Rock, noted that the leaked data
“could prove valuable to cybercriminals who use people’s personal information to impersonate them or scam them into handing over login credentials.” 86 Other researchers posit that the data could be used to gain access to
individuals’ Facebook accounts, email accounts, and other social networking
accounts because, once a hacker has a victim’s email address, they might be
able to log into their other accounts by pairing the email address with simple
passwords. 87 Phone numbers, in particular, have “taken on new significance
and potential value to attackers” as they are “ubiquitous identifiers, linking
you to different parts of your digital life” and “play[ing] a role in sensitive authentication.” 88 Shockingly, just days after its Facebook story, Insider reported
that the personal data of over 500 million LinkedIn users were also scraped
and published for sale online. 89
Scraping also has the potential to influence elections by extracting personally identifiable information in order to target individual voters. Aggregate
IQ, a Canadian digital advertising and software development company, infamously influenced the United Kingdom’s 2016 EU referendum by scraping
/04/13/facial-recognition-false-arrest-lawsuit [perma.cc/2GW7-V2TS] (detailing false arrest
due to use of facial recognition software by the Detroit Police Department).
84. Aaron Holmes, 533 Million Facebook Users’ Phone Numbers and Personal Data Have
Been Leaked Online, INSIDER (Apr. 3, 2021, 10:41 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/stolen-data-of-533-million-facebook-users-leaked-online-2021-4 [perma.cc/5W5Y-6KY6].
85. Mike Clark, The Facts on News Reports About Facebook Data, FACEBOOK (Apr. 6,
2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/04/facts-on-news-reports-about-facebook-data [perma.cc
/HLM2-V92M].
86. Holmes, supra note 84.
87. E.g., Mostafa Rachwani, Facebook Data Leak: Australians Urged to Check and Secure
Social Media Accounts, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2021, 4:18 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/apr/05/facebook-data-leak-2021-breach-check-australia-users [perma.cc/4BRNQUZX].
88. Lily Hay Newman, What Really Caused Facebook’s 500M-User Data Leak?, WIRED
(Apr. 6, 2021, 7:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-data-leak-500-million-usersphone-numbers [perma.cc/NX2C-V2G4].
89. Katie Canales, Hackers Scraped Data from 500 Million LinkedIn Users—About TwoThirds of the Platform’s Userbase—and Have Posted It for Sale Online, INSIDER (Apr. 8, 2021,
12:34 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/linkedin-data-scraped-500-million-users-forsale-online-2021-4 [perma.cc/Y35R-5G5Q]. In October 2021, several news outlets reported that
the scraped personal information of another 1.5 billion Facebook users was allegedly being sold
on a hacking forum, but as of this writing, the claim is unverified. Ryan Mac, No, There Isn’t
Proof That the Private Data of 1.5 Billion Facebook Users Is Being Sold by Hackers., N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2021, 11:11 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/05/technology/fb-hackers-datasale.html [perma.cc/9FPS-QMNX].
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individuals’ profile information on LinkedIn and Facebook and serving them
targeted ads supporting the “Vote Leave” campaign. 90 In 2016, Donald
Trump’s campaign hired the political data firm Cambridge Analytica, which
scraped the private information of more than fifty million Facebook users.91
The firm used these data to “identify the personalities of American voters and
influence their behavior” 92 and “orchestrate[] emotionally charged political
campaigns that advanced demeaning, racialized, nationalistic propaganda.” 93
Finally, data scraping can place people in physical danger by easing access
to individuals’ whereabouts. The story of Judge Esther Salas of the District of
New Jersey illustrates the perils of publicizing personal information. In July
2020, an angered attorney sought revenge against Judge Salas for her handling
of a lawsuit he filed in her court. 94 On a Sunday afternoon, the attorney
showed up to Judge Salas’s home and rang her doorbell. 95 Her only son, a college student named Daniel, opened the door. The attorney fired multiple gunshots, shooting and killing Daniel. He then shot Judge Salas’s husband three
times, seriously wounding him. 96
Easy access to Judge Salas’s personal information—including her home
address—enabled the gunman to hunt down her family. In a New York Times
op-ed, Judge Salas wrote that FBI agents informed her of how easy it is to find
and purchase personal information about judges on the internet, including
photos of their homes and the license plates on their vehicles. 97 In Judge Salas’s
case, the gunman “was able to create a complete dossier of her life: he stalked
her neighborhood, mapped her routes to work, and even learned the names
of her best friend and the church she attended.” 98 This access to Judge Salas’s
personal information was completely legal, and it enabled the shooter to kill

90. See DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, DISINFORMATION AND
‘FAKE NEWS’: FINAL REPORT, 2017–19, HC 1791, at 45, 48 (UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf [perma.cc/X4XB-Q2RX].
91. Sarah Perez & Zack Whittaker, Facebook Sues Two Companies Engaged in Data Scraping Operations, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 1, 2020, 4:54 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/01/facebook-sues-two-companies-engaged-in-data-scraping-operations [perma.cc/6YE8-QTTV]
(“Cambridge Analytica infamously scraped millions of Facebook profiles in the run-up to the
2016 presidential election in order to target undecided voters.”); Kevin Granville, Facebook and
Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html
[perma.cc/TQ6H-PYWJ].
92. Granville, supra note 91.
93. Tsesis, supra note 7, at 607.
94. Esther Salas, Opinion, My Son Was Killed Because I’m a Federal Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/opinion/esther-salas-murder-federal-judges.html
[perma.cc/N2TW-BYN9]; see also Nicole Hong, William K. Rashbaum & Mihir Zaveri, ‘Antifeminist’ Lawyer Is Suspect in Killing of Son of Federal Judge in N.J., N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/nyregion/esther-salas.html [perma.cc/HV87-7NY5].
95. See Salas, supra note 94.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (cleaned up).
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her only child. 99 Although it is not clear whether data scraping may have contributed to this specific incident, there is no question that data scraping could
facilitate harm through collecting and publicizing personal information of the
kind that allowed the gunman to arrive at Judge Salas’s door.
Using bots to scrape data in bulk from various publicly available sources
makes it easier to collect and compile an abundance of personal information
for potentially malicious purposes. Scraping enables its practitioners to more
easily create a “complete dossier” of an individual’s life. It can increase false
arrests and influence elections. It’s a useful tool for scammers, stalkers, and
scoundrels. And what’s worse, as the next Section explains, is that no existing
or proposed legislation restricts scraping publicly available personal information.
B. Scraping Personal Information Circumvents Current and Proposed
Privacy Laws
Existing and proposed consumer privacy laws fail to adequately protect
individuals’ personal information from data scrapers. Indeed, there is currently no comprehensive data privacy legislation enacted at the federal level. 100
However, responding to rising enthusiasm for consumer data privacy protection, several states have enacted or introduced legislation to protect the privacy of their residents’ personal information, including California, 101 New

99. Id. Since this incident, Judge Salas has called on Congress to pass the Daniel Anderl
Judicial Security and Privacy Act, named after her son. Id. The Act “would protect judges’ personally identifiable information from resale by data brokers” and “allow federal judges to redact
personal information displayed on federal government internet sites and prevent publication of
[their] personal information . . . where there is no legitimate news media interest or matter of public concern.” Id. The Act was introduced to the Senate in July 2021 but had not passed as of
February 2022. Mark Brnovich & Gurbir S. Grewal, Opinion, Congress Must Pass Daniel’s Law to
Protect Federal Judges, ROLL CALL (July 16, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://rollcall.com/2021/07/16/congress-must-pass-daniels-law-to-protect-federal-judges [perma.cc/6UHL-Y3BX]; see Daniel Anderl Judiciary Security and Privacy Act of 2021, S. 2340, 117th Cong. (2021). A version of this
legislation was enacted, however, in the state of New Jersey. See Governor Murphy Signs “Daniel’s
Law,” STATE OF N.J. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562020/approved
/20201120b.shtml [perma.cc/S3PY-MH2B].
100. Wendy Zhang, Comprehensive Federal Privacy Law Still Pending, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan.
22, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/comprehensive-federal-privacy-law-still-pending [perma.cc/N9EH-27MT]; see also Yallen, supra note 12, at 796–99.
101. California Consumer Privacy Act, ch. 55, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807 (codified as amended
at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.198 (West Supp. 2021)); see Daisuke Wakabayashi, California
Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacy-law.html [perma.cc/HA9P-UWAF].
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York, 102 Virginia, 103 Nevada, 104 Florida, 105 Colorado, 106 New Hampshire, 107
Washington, 108 and Illinois. 109 But even the strictest regulations contain gaping regulatory holes allowing scrapers to run wild with individuals’ data.
California has enacted the most comprehensive data privacy laws to date
in the United States. 110 The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) went
into effect in 2020 and provides Californians with certain rights regarding
businesses’ collection and sale of their personal information. 111 The California
Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) was then enacted in November 2020 and will take
effect in January 2023. 112 It expands upon the CCPA, creating a new agency
called the California Privacy Protection Agency dedicated to enforcing the new

102. New York Privacy Act, S. 6701, 2021–2022 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021); see ALEXANDER H.
SOUTHWELL ET AL., GIBSON DUNN, NEW YORK PRIVACY ACT UPDATE: BILL OUT OF
COMMITTEE, MOVES TO FULL SENATE (2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/new-york-privacy-act-update-bill-out-of-committee-moves-to-full-senate.pdf
[perma.cc/WUB3-J7YB].
103. Consumer Data Protection Act, ch. 35 (codified at VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 59.1-575 to 585 (Supp. 2021)); see Rebecca Klar, Virginia Governor Signs Comprehensive Data Privacy Law,
HILL (Mar. 2, 2021, 5:24 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/541290-virginia-governorsigns-comprehensive-data-privacy-law [perma.cc/7EPW-WK8Y].
104. Gretchen A. Ramos, Ed Chansky & Cathy C. Shyong, Nevada Passes Opt-Out Privacy
Law, Effective October 1, 2019, NAT’L L. REV. (June 5, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/nevada-passes-opt-out-privacy-law-effective-october-1-2019 [perma.cc/4XLS-K5AB].
105. Kate Black, Florida’s Next: FL Consumer Privacy Bill Introduced, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan.
24, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/florida-s-next-fl-consumer-privacy-bill-introduced [perma.cc/ZXU4-EPJP].
106. Act of July 7, 2021, ch. 483, § 1, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3445, 3445–65 (codified at
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-1301 to -1313 (2021)); see RYAN BERGSIEKER, SARAH ERICKSON, LISA
ZIVKOVIC & ERIC HORNBECK, GIBSON DUNN, THE COLORADO PRIVACY ACT: ENACTMENT OF
COMPREHENSIVE U.S. STATE CONSUMER PRIVACY LAWS CONTINUES (2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/the-colorado-privacy-act-enactment-of-comprehensiveu-s-state-consumer-privacy-laws-continues.pdf [perma.cc/XUC2-Q5RK].
107. Gretchen A. Ramos & Darren Abernethy, Additional U.S. States Advance the State
Privacy Legislation Trend in 2020, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.natlawreview
.com/article/additional-us-states-advance-state-privacy-legislation-trend-2020 [perma.cc/646L5FW6].
108. Jake Holland, Washington State Inches Closer to Passing Consumer Privacy Law,
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 4, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecomlaw/washington-state-inches-closer-to-passing-consumer-privacy-law [perma.cc/8AMK-2MQP].
109. Ramos & Abernethy, supra note 107.
110. Andy Green, Complete Guide to Privacy Laws in the US, VARONIS (Apr. 2, 2021),
https://www.varonis.com/blog/us-privacy-laws [perma.cc/X7CS-UCDG].
111. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.120 (West
Supp. 2021) (amended 2020).
112. Lara O’Reilly, Prop 24—the California Privacy Rights and Enforcement Act—Passed
by Voters. Here’s What Publishers Need Know, DIGIDAY (Nov. 5, 2020), https://digiday.com/media/prop-24-the-california-privacy-rights-and-enforcement-act-passed-by-voters-heres-whatpublishers-need-know [perma.cc/DX93-GUSG].
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privacy law. 113 But California’s legislation, however, does not prevent companies from using bots to scrape personal information from publicly available
websites. Scraped data falls outside of its scope and remains unregulated.
To illustrate, the CPRA gives California consumers the ability to opt out
from companies sharing, selling, or even retaining their data. 114 But what if
those third parties simply scrape their data instead? In that case, the information was neither shared nor sold. The scrapers just took it, leaving the subjects unable to opt out. The CPRA also allows consumers to request disclosure
of the “categories of personal information that the business collected about
the consumer” and the “categories of personal information that the business
sold or shared about the consumer and the categories of third parties to whom
the personal information was sold or shared.” 115 But consumers cannot be
made aware of this same information if some unknown party simply scrapes
their data.
While section 1798.100 of the CPRA provides an expansive notice-at-collection provision, requiring certain businesses to inform their consumers
about aspects of personal data collection, 116 publicly available information remains unprotected by that same statute’s definition of “personal information.”
The definition of “personal information” in section 1798.140(v)(2) expressly
excludes publicly available information. 117 Thus, the statute permits businesses to scrape personal information from publicly available websites without providing any notice.
Moreover, regulations issued by California’s attorney general pursuant to
the CPRA provide that “[a] business that does not collect personal information directly from the consumer does not need to provide a notice at collection to the consumer if it does not sell the consumer’s personal

113. Austin Mooney & Amy C. Pimentel, California Voters Approve the California Privacy
Rights Act, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-voters-approve-california-privacy-rights-act [perma.cc/55WZ-XQGS].
114. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.105, 1798.120 (West Supp. 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023);
David Alpert, Note, Beyond Request-and-Respond: Why Data Access Will Be Insufficient to Tame
Big Tech, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (2020).
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.115(a)(1)–(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
116. Id. § 1798.100(a)(1)–(2).
117. The section states as follows:
“Personal information” does not include publicly available information or lawfully obtained, truthful information that is a matter of public concern. For purposes of this paragraph, “publicly available” means: information that is lawfully made available from
federal, state, or local government records, or information that a business has a reasonable basis to believe is lawfully made available to the general public by the consumer or
from widely distributed media, or by the consumer; or information made available by a
person to whom the consumer has disclosed the information if the consumer has not
restricted the information to a specific audience. “Publicly available” does not mean biometric information collected by a business about a consumer without the consumer’s
knowledge.

Id. § 1798.140(v)(2).
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information.” 118 Thus, a business that collects a consumer’s personal information by scraping it from an intermediate source only needs to provide notice to the consumer if it intends to sell it. 119 The language in these provisions
reveals a gaping hole in personal data privacy regulations.
Other states have followed California’s lead, but similarly fail to address
privacy concerns for publicly available data. Virginia, for example, became the
second state to enact a comprehensive data privacy statute in March 2021.120
Virginia’s law, the Consumer Data Protection Act, imposes data processing
obligations for businesses processing consumers’ personal information, and it
gives consumers various privacy rights similar to those granted by California
law. 121 The legislation contains no private right of action and exempts several
entities and types of data. 122 Like the California legislation, it excludes publicly
available information from its definition of “personal data,” 123 and it defines
“publicly available information” broadly, encompassing information that “a
business has a reasonable basis to believe is lawfully made available to the general public through widely distributed media, by the consumer, or by a person
to whom the consumer has disclosed the information, unless the consumer
has restricted the information to a specific audience.”124 The law also limits
the obligations imposed on data processors where those obligations “adversely
affect[] the rights or freedoms of any persons, such as exercising the right of
free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 125
Similar defects are present in Colorado’s recently enacted privacy law, the
third comprehensive data privacy statute adopted in the United States. 126 Like
its California and Virginia kin, the Colorado Privacy Act excludes publicly
available information from the scope of its regulations, and its definition of
“publicly available information” covers any “information that a controller has
a reasonable basis to believe the consumer has lawfully made available to the
118. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.305 (2021).
119. Nate Garhart, Data Scraping Under the Revised CCPA Regulations, FARELLA BRAUN
+ MARTEL: PRIV. BLOG (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.farellaprivacy.com/2020/03/data-scrapingunder-the-revised-ccpa-regulations [perma.cc/46NQ-CFCE].
120. Kurt R. Hunt & Matthew A. Diaz, Virginia Becomes 2nd State to Adopt a Comprehensive Consumer Data Privacy Law, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.natlawreview
.com/article/virginia-becomes-2nd-state-to-adopt-comprehensive-consumer-data-privacy-law
[perma.cc/7P3F-RHYB].
121. See id.; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-575 to -585 (Supp. 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
122. Natasha G. Kohne et al., Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act: What Businesses Need
to Know, AKIN GUMP (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/virginiaconsumer-data-protection-act-what-businesses-need-to-know.html [perma.cc/2BDN-Z9LY].
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 59.1-582(E).
126. Act of July 7, 2021, ch. 483, § 1, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3445, 3445–65 (codified at
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-1301 to -1313 (2021)); see Cynthia J. Larose & Christopher J.
Buontempo, And Now There Are Three. . . . The Colorado Privacy Act, NAT’L L. REV. (July 16,
2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/and-now-there-are-three-colorado-privacy-act
[perma.cc/5DKD-A623].
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general public.” 127 In sum, businesses scraping publicly available personal data
remain unregulated even by the most expansive state data privacy laws.
At the federal level, privacy legislation has been similarly inadequate. For
example, the proposed Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of 2020 exempts publicly available information from its scope. 128 It also contains a broad
definition of publicly available information, 129 permitting data scrapers to extract whatever personal information is posted on publicly available websites so
long as there is a reasonable basis to believe that the individual volunteered it.
Another proposal, the SAFE DATA Act, similarly excludes publicly available information from its protection. 130 It broadly defines “publicly available
information” to include any information that the entity reasonably believes
has been made widely available to the general public, including information
from a public website. 131 The Online Privacy Act 132 and the Privacy Bill of
Rights Act 133 are comparably deficient because they also exclude publicly
available information. 134 Simply put: no currently enacted or proposed legislation in the United States satisfactorily shields individuals’ publicly available
personal information from the claws of data scrapers.
C. An Alternative Framework: The European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation
In sharp contrast with the United States, the European Union considers
data privacy a fundamental right. 135 Even the scope of what is considered “personal data” or “personally identifiable information” differs substantially. In
the United States, these terms apply to specific categories of information, with

127. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1303(17)(b) (2021).
128. Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of 2020, S. 3456, 116th Cong. § 2(9)(C)(iv)
(2020).
129. Id. § 2(13) (“The term ‘publicly available information’ means any information that a
covered entity or service provider has a reasonable basis to believe is lawfully made available to
the general public from[] (i) a Federal, State, or local government record; (ii) widely distributed
media; or (iii) a disclosure to the general public that is made voluntarily by the individual, or
required to be made by a Federal, State, or local law.”).
130. See S. 4626, 116th Cong. § 2(10)(C)(iv) (2020).
131. Id. § 2(10)(G) (“[T]he term ‘publicly available information’ means any information
that a covered entity has a reasonable basis to believe . . . is widely available to the general public,
including information from a telephone book or online directory; television, internet, or radio
content or programming; or the news media or a website that is lawfully available to the general
public on an unrestricted basis . . . .” (cleaned up)).
132. Online Privacy Act of 2019, H.R. 4978, 116th Cong. (2019).
133. Privacy Bill of Rights Act, S. 1214, 116th Cong. (2019).
134. See H.R. 4978, § 2(13)(B)(i) (“The term ‘personal information’ does not include[]
publicly available information related to an individual . . . .”); S. 1214, § 2(10)(C)(i) (2019) (“The
term ‘personal information’ does not include publicly available information.”). Notably, each of
these bills contains a much narrower definition of “publicly available information,” which is a
certainly preferable step in the right direction with respect to regulating data scraping.
135. Voss & Houser, supra note 12, at 296.
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restrictions placed on the use of those categories of information applying only
to certain industries. 136 Conversely, the EU’s definition of personal data is deliberately broad and aimed at protecting an individual’s right to privacy. 137
Comparing these legal frameworks reveals that the United States’ laws are underdeveloped with respect to ensuring data privacy for its people. If the United
States wishes to make progress in this field, it should follow Europe’s lead.
In 2016, the EU passed the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).138
It is described as “the toughest privacy and security law in the world,” imposing obligations on any organization—regardless of location—that targets or
collects data related to people in the EU. 139 Unlike the CPRA, the GDPR’s definition of “personal data” contains no exception for publicly available information. 140 The regulation provides EU citizens with rights, including the right
to be notified when their personal data are collected, the right to access any of
their collected personal data, the right to rectify inaccurate personal data, and
the right to erasure of their personal data. 141
Most relevant to the issue of data scraping is article 14 of the GDPR. It
obligates data controllers 142 to inform those whose personal data they intend
to process when the information in question has not been directly obtained
from them—for instance, when their personal data have been scraped off the
public internet. 143 Pursuant to article 14, data scrapers—when they scrape
136. Id. at 313.
137. Id.
138. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter
General Data Protection Regulation].
139. Ben Wolford, What is GDPR, the EU’s New Data Protection Law?, GDPR.EU,
https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr [perma.cc/3FQ4-55GL].
140. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 138, art. 4(1); see also Piotr Foitzik,
Publicly Available Data Under the GDPR: Main Considerations, IAPP (May 28, 2019),
https://iapp.org/news/a/publicly-available-data-under-gdpr-main-considerations [perma.cc
/NC62-X6ZC] (“[T]he GDPR applies in full irrespective of if the data are or were publicly available or not.”).
141. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 138, arts. 12–23.
142. A “controller” under the GDPR is a “natural or legal person, public authority, agency
or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data.” Id. art. 4(7).
143. The article states:
Where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject, the controller shall
provide the data subject with the following information: (a) the identity and the contact
details of the controller and, where applicable, of the controller’s representative; (b) the
contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable; (c) the purposes of the
processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing; (d) the categories of personal data concerned; (e) the recipients or categories of
recipients of the personal data, if any; (f) where applicable, that the controller intends to
transfer personal data to a recipient in a third country or international organisation . . . .

Id. art. 14(1); see also Fiona Campbell, Data Scraping—What Are the Privacy Implications?, PRIV.
& DATA PROT., Oct./Nov. 2019, at 3.
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publicly available personal information concerning persons in the EU—must
provide extensive notice to every data subject 144 within one month of scraping
their data. 145
However, even when data scrapers are able to provide such notice to all
of the data subjects, the scraping must still meet certain criteria for it to be
lawful. Article 5 provides that personal data shall be collected for “specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes.” 146 Moreover, scrapers may only collect information necessary for the purposes for which the data are processed 147 and
may not retain personal data longer than is necessary for those purposes. 148
Finally, the GDPR requires a lawful basis for data collection. There are six
lawful bases available under the GDPR: (1) consent, (2) contract with the data
subject, (3) compliance with a legal obligation, (4) vital interest, (5) public interest, and (6) legitimate interest. 149 Of these, the only fitting lawful ground
for scraping is legitimate interest. 150 For scraping to satisfy the legitimate-interest lawful-basis requirement, the data scraper’s legitimate interest must
outweigh the data subject’s “interests or fundamental rights and freedoms.”151
Together, these requirements dramatically restrict lawful data-scraping activity.
In March 2019, Poland’s Data Protection Agency (DPA), acting pursuant
to the GDPR, issued its first fine involving data scraping. 152 The agency held
that Bisnode—a digital marketing company that scraped six million people’s
personal data—failed to respect data subject rights set out in article 14 of the
GDPR because it did not notify the data subjects. 153 Bisnode was slapped with
a €220,000 fine and given three months to comply with article 14’s information-notification requirements. 154 Bisnode attempted to meet its notification obligation through a website posting, but the Polish DPA “rejected the
argument that placing a privacy notice on the data scraping business’s website

144. “Data subject” is the term used by the GDPR to refer to an “identified or identifiable
natural person,” and “personal data” refers to “any information relating to” a data subject. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 138, art. 4(1).
145. Id. art. 14(3).
146. Id. art. 5(1)(b).
147. Id. art. 5(1)(c).
148. Id. art. 5(1)(e).
149. Id. art. 6(1)(a)–(f).
150. Fiona Campbell, Data Scraping—Considering the Privacy Issues, FIELDFISHER (Aug.
27, 2019), https://www.fieldfisher.com/en/services/privacy-security-and-information/privacy-security-and-information-law-blog/data-scraping-considering-the-privacy-issues [perma.cc/ZR554BSH].
151. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 138, art. 6(f); see also Campbell, supra
note 150.
152. Natasha Lomas, Covert Data-Scraping on Watch as EU DPA Lays Down ‘Radical’ GDPR
Red-Line, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 30, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/30/covertdata-scraping-on-watch-as-eu-dpa-lays-down-radical-gdpr-red-line [perma.cc/T5QG-3L4N].
153. Id.
154. Id.
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was enough to notify individuals, particularly where individuals were not
aware that their data had been scraped and was being processed.” 155 Similarly,
in April 2021, Spain’s data protection authority ordered Equifax to delete personal data it collected and pay a fine of about $1.1 million for including in
credit reports publicly available data it scraped from government sources
about individuals’ outstanding debts. 156
As Section II.B analyzed, the current and proposed data privacy statutes
in the United States contain loopholes that allow data scraping of personal
information to go unregulated. However, the GDPR’s application to U.S.
companies does not fill those loopholes. Instead, the GDPR should serve as a
model for U.S. legislation with respect to preventing and deterring scraping
individuals’ personal information.
Even though U.S. companies are not exempt from the GDPR’s territorial
scope, 157 domestic legislation is required to similarly protect U.S. persons’ data
from data scrapers. The GDPR’s regulations apply to companies established
in the EU and companies (including those in the United States) that process
personal data of subjects who are in the EU. 158 Notably, the GDPR’s application is not limited to the collection and processing of EU citizens and residents’ data. For example, it includes U.S. persons located within EU borders
when their data is processed. 159
But the fact that a U.S. company complies with the GDPR does not necessarily mean that domestic U.S. persons’ data is protected. First, companies
often have different versions of their websites based on the various territories
in which they do business, each version providing different data privacy
rights, policies, and procedures. 160 Companies that comply with the GDPR
155. Campbell, supra note 150; see also Christopher Escobedo Hart, Data Scraping, at
Home and Abroad, SEC. PRIV. & L. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com
/2019/09/data-craping-at-home-and-abroad [perma.cc/W6LH-3WQC].
156. Catherine Stupp, Data Scraping in EU Regulators’ Sights as Spain Orders Equifax to
Delete Information, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/datascraping-in-eu-regulators-sights-as-spain-orders-equifax-to-delete-information-11620293400
[perma.cc/B8DD-MUYV].
157. Lucy Handley, US Companies Are Not Exempt from Europe’s New Data Privacy
Rules—and Here’s What They Need to Do About It, CNBC (May 23, 2018, 11:09 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/25/gdpr-data-privacy-rules-in-europe-and-how-they-apply-tous-companies.html [perma.cc/VJR5-EF4V]; Yaki Faitelson, Yes, the GDPR Will Affect Your U.S.Based Business, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/12/04/yes-the-gdpr-will-affect-your-u-s-based-business [perma.cc/Z8UH-GZN6].
158. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 138, art. 3.
159. See Faitelson, supra note 157.
160. For example, the athletic apparel brand Adidas’s U.S. website differs sharply from its
Irish website with respect to privacy rights provided to visitors. If a visitor clicks the “data settings” link in the footer of Adidas’s Irish website, the website launches a pop-up allowing users
to have their data sent to them or deleted pursuant to rights bestowed by the GDPR. ADIDAS.IE,
https://www.adidas.ie [perma.cc/P7YZ-CWMX]. If a visitor clicks the same link on the U.S.
website, the site prompts them to select their state; if they select California, they are provided
with similar options pursuant to the rights conferred by the CCPA. ADIDAS.COM,
https://www.adidas.com/us [perma.cc/UN4B-DNAX]. If the user selects any other state, users
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may do so only on a territorial basis, and their scraping activity may similarly
follow territorial bounds.
Second, even if U.S. companies chose to follow GDPR standards for all
data subjects (including domestic U.S. persons), this would not confer upon
U.S. persons the full breadth of the GDPR’s rights and protections, requiring
domestic legislation to fill the gaps. For example, article 82 of the GDPR provides the right to compensation for “[a]ny person who has suffered material
or non-material damage as a result of an infringement” of the GDPR. 161 Article 77 permits such persons to “lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority” to enforce their rights. 162 Conversely, domestic U.S. persons, who the
GDPR does not protect, would not have any such remedy or method to enforce their rights without U.S.-specific legislation. Thus, a U.S. company that
scrapes personal data without providing notice at collection pursuant to article 14 would be subject to liability only where the personal data collected are
that of persons in the EU, but the company would not be subject to liability
for scraping data of persons in the United States. If no notice is provided (or
if the collection violates other provisions of the GDPR), persons in the EU can
lodge a complaint to enforce their rights; persons in the United States cannot.
For these reasons, the United States must enact domestic privacy legislation to ensure similar data protection for its people, and it should look to the
GDPR as a model for such legislation. With respect to data scraping, a domestic statute aligned with the GDPR should contain a definition of personal information that doesn’t exclude publicly available information 163 and a
provision similar to article 14, which requires a business to give notice to data
subjects whose information it scrapes from the internet. 164
III. A PROPOSAL FOR CALIFORNIA: “FAIR COLLECTION”
While passing legislation at the federal level could be desirable, this Part
asserts that California should reform its data privacy legislation to conform
with the protections afforded by the GDPR. Doing so would deter impermissible scraping by providing a remedy to individuals whose personal information has been scraped without notice. Finally, this Part addresses potential
counterarguments, including concerns regarding the First Amendment implications of attempting to regulate the collection of publicly available data.

are merely provided another link to read the Adidas privacy policy, with no options to have their
data sent to them or deleted. Id.
161. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 138, art. 82(1).
162. Id. art. 77.
163. See id. art. 4(1).
164. See id. art. 14(1).
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A. California Should Adopt GDPR-Style Regulations to Shield Publicly
Available Personal Information from Data Scrapers
In the United States, many have called for preemptive legislation at the federal level to fill the domestic consumer data privacy void. 165 Several reports indicate that both Democrats and Republicans want to “take on Big Tech” with
laws and regulations addressing several issues, including data privacy.166 To be
clear, data privacy legislation at the federal level could be beneficial. But to date,
Congress’s federal privacy legislation has been limited to sector-specific laws. 167
Gridlock in Washington might diminish any potential for an all-encompassing data privacy law, 168 especially one that addresses this Note’s narrow
topic of scraping publicly available personal information. Consumer privacy
advocates have raised the concern that federal legislation would not embrace
the comprehensiveness and strictness of the CPRA or GDPR. 169 The fear is
that federal preemptive legislation would “wipe[] out more stringent state
rules” like those in California. 170 And despite the benefits that might flow from
uniformity throughout the nation, consumers could be left with “the lowest
common denominator” of privacy legislation. 171 Instead, some argue that any
federal standard should serve as a minimum level of compliance, allowing
states to pass their own stronger laws. 172 Because this Note is narrowly focused

165. See, e.g., Saquella, supra note 12, at 243–45 (calling for a preemptive federal law on
data privacy because “various state laws will create inconsistent privacy rights” and “data protection and privacy breaches do not respect state boundaries”); Yallen, supra note 12, at 821–25;
Kessler, supra note 12, at 121–27 (“[T]he United States ultimately should adopt a federal standard that offers consumers similar protections as the GDPR and the CCPA. This would eliminate
the issue of complying with a patchwork system as well as potential Dormant Commerce Clause
challenges of state laws.”).
166. Cecilia Kang, Democratic Congress Prepares to Take on Big Tech, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/technology/congress-antitrust-tech.html [perma
.cc/PYZ5-U5TN]; see also Karen Schuler, Federal Data Privacy Regulation Is on the Way—That’s
a Good Thing, IAPP (Jan. 22, 2021), https://iapp.org/news/a/federal-data-privacy-regulation-ison-the-way-thats-a-good-thing [perma.cc/UY83-WBGK].
167. Saquella, supra note 12, at 228–29. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), for example, provides data privacy and security for medical information,
and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act protects certain data in the financial sector. Id.
168. Kessler, supra note 12, at 123.
169. See id. at 122–23 (“[S]everal technology companies have said they would embrace a
federal privacy law . . . . One caveat is that most of these companies would oppose a law as strict
as the GDPR, and privacy advocates argue that these companies may merely want to preempt
laws like the CCPA and set a diluted standard that is far more lenient than California’s.”).
170. Allison Grande, Federal Privacy Law Shouldn’t Lower the Bar, Senators Told,
LAW360 (Oct. 10, 2018, 10:36 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1090519/federal-privacylaw-shouldn-t-lower-the-bar-senators-told [perma.cc/2SU9-8MVF]; see also Rebecca Klar &
Chris Mills Rodrigo, New State Privacy Initiatives Turn Up Heat on Congress, HILL (Feb. 10,
2021, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/538122-new-state-privacy-initiativesturn-up-heat-on-congress [perma.cc/2AZ3-4APF].
171. Grande, supra note 170.
172. Kessler, supra note 12, at 125.
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on reforming the way privacy law treats publicly available personal information for purposes of data scraping, the most straightforward approach is to
amend the California legislation. Doing so could serve as a model for future
federal legislation.
To address data scraping of publicly available personal information, California should amend its privacy laws enacted through the CCPA and CPRA.
First, it should remove section 1798.140(v)(2), which, as previously noted, excludes publicly available information from its definition of personal information. 173 Removing this provision would keep publicly available personal
information within the scope of California’s privacy protections, as it remains
within the scope of the GDPR’s protections. 174
Second, California should not exempt businesses from notice-at-collection requirements when they do not collect personal information directly
from the consumer. 175 Thus, as in article 14 of the GDPR, businesses would
also have to provide notice when collecting personal information indirectly or
from a source other than the data subject. 176
Third, California should expand the private right of action provided by
section 1798.150. Currently, that provision only permits consumers to bring
civil actions if their information is subject to a data breach. 177 It should be expanded to allow consumers to bring civil actions when businesses fail to notify
individuals that their personal data have been collected.
In place of the removed provisions, California’s legislature ought to adopt
a more nuanced approach that would prohibit most forms of data scraping
while permitting innocuous collections of personal information. This would
be similar to permitting scraping where there is a lawful basis under the
GDPR. 178 Here, this Note envisions permitting data scraping when the information collected is more likely to be anonymized, is not collected in bulk, and
is collected for journalistic or academic purposes. Just as the “fair use” doctrine in the Copyright Act allows certain permissible uses of a copyrighted
work to avoid copyright infringement liability, 179 California’s privacy regulations should exempt certain collections and uses of personal information that
it deems permissible when the personal information is not collected directly
from the subject. Let’s call it “fair collection.” This Note proposes the following language:
173. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(v)(2) (West Supp. 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023) (“ ‘Personal information’ does not include publicly available information or lawfully obtained, truthful
information that is a matter of public concern.”).
174. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 138, art. 4(1).
175. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
176. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 138, art. 14.
177. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150.
178. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 138, art. 6(1)(a)–(f).
179. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”).
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Notwithstanding § 1798.100, the “fair collection” of personal information—
such as when the personal information is collected in small quantities for
academic, educational, or journalistic purposes—is exempt from the noticeat-collection requirements when the personal information is not collected
directly from the consumer. In determining whether the collection of personal information in any particular case constitutes “fair collection,” the factors to be considered shall include:
(a) the personal nature of the information collected, such as whether the
information is anonymized or is capable of individually identifying a person;
(b) the volume of the information collected; and
(c) the purpose and character of the collection, including whether the collection is done for academic or legitimate news reporting purposes or to address matters of public concern, or instead is collected for commercial
purposes.

Taking a “fair collection” approach would allow California to regulate
data scrapers that collect massive amounts of personal data for commercial
purposes while permitting small amounts of data collection when it is unlikely
to be harmful.
The three proposed factors close the present gaps in the CCPA and CPRA.
Factor (a) considers whether the information collected is capable of personally
identifying an individual, which is the reason for regulating this activity in the
first place. Some information, like health data or internet browsing history, is
capable of anonymization and thus could be permissibly collected. But collecting an email address, IP address, phone number, or an image of someone’s
face should be regulated because such information is inextricably linked to a
particular individual and cannot be anonymized unless outright redacted.
Factor (b) considers the volume of the data collected. Data scraping is a
particular method of gathering information. What makes scraping different
from an individual user manually gathering information from the internet is
the ability for the data scraper to collect information automatically and in
bulk. 180 If a business downloads a handful of publicly available email addresses, that could be exempted from regulation under this Note’s proposal.
But if a business uses bots to collect thousands of email addresses from some
publicly available source, it would be regulated. The absence of a bright-line
rule for what volume of collection is permissible is a feature, not a bug. If

180. A similar observation was made in the data-scraping case Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Scraping or otherwise recording data from a site that is accessible
to the public is merely a particular use of information that plaintiffs are entitled to see. . . . Employing a bot to crawl a website . . . does not constitute an access violation [under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act] when the human who creates the bot is otherwise allowed to read and
interact with that site. . . . [B]ots are simply technological tools for humans to more efficiently
collect and process information that they could otherwise access manually.” (citations omitted)).
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scrapers aren’t sure how much collection is too much, that uncertainty functions to deter scraping. 181 Conversely, if businesses knew that scraping under
a certain volume of personal data would likely be permissible, they might confidently continue to do so.
Factor (c) considers the purpose and character of the collection. Personal
data collected for commercial purposes would be subject to greater scrutiny
than data collected for academic or journalistic purposes, or to address matters of public concern. Taken together, collecting publicly available personal
information would be permissible when the information is less likely to identify a specific individual, the collection only concerns a small number of data
subjects, and the collection furthers a beneficial public purpose. Collecting
publicly available personal information would be impermissible when the information identifies individual subjects, is collected in large quantities, and is
collected for commercial purposes. This proposed reform would finally address data scraping and protect individuals’ personal information regardless
of whether it is publicly available. Further, it would align the protections of
the CPRA more closely to those of the GDPR.
While this Note cites many instances of scraping activity conducted by
businesses, individual malicious actors also partake in data scraping. Recall
the massive leaks of over 533 million Facebook users’ 182 and 500 million
LinkedIn users’ personal information obtained by data scrapers. 183 As of this
writing, there is no indication that any corporate data firm was responsible for
this bulk scraping. 184 The reporting suggests that both leaks were the result of
coordinated scraping efforts conducted by individuals, not businesses.
Shouldn’t California’s privacy legislation regulate this activity as well?
Presently, the CPRA’s regulations apply only to businesses that (a) have
annual gross revenues in excess of $25 million; (b) buy, sell, or share the personal information of 100,000 or more consumers or households; or (c) derive
50 percent or more of their annual revenues from selling or sharing consumers’ personal information. 185 Individuals who collect personal data are not regulated. While a proposal to enact civil or criminal sanctions on individuals is
beyond the scope of this Note, California should also consider methods to address massive data collection at the hands of individual scrapers who might
use the data to conduct scams and cybercrimes.

181. See Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REV. 467, 496 (2008) (“[S]anction uncertainty can be harnessed to augment
the deterrent effect of the criminal system.”).
182. Holmes, supra note 84.
183. Canales, supra note 89.
184. Business Insider reported that the leaked data was discovered when “a user in [a] hacking forum advertised an automated bot that could provide phone numbers for hundreds of millions of Facebook users for a price.” Holmes, supra note 84. Additionally, Facebook’s blog post
in response to the scraping and subsequent data leak refers to the scrapers as “fraudsters” and
“malicious actors,” not as corporations or business entities. Clark, supra note 85.
185. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(d)(1) (West Supp. 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
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B. Addressing First Amendment Concerns
Critics of limiting scraping in the ways this Note proposes would likely
argue that such restrictions violate the First Amendment. 186 In Sorrel v. IMS
Health Inc., the Supreme Court held that creating and disseminating information qualify as protected speech under the First Amendment. 187 While restrictions on scraping would not directly implicate the publication of personal
information, they would limit accessing and recording publicly available
facts—activities that contribute to the creation of speech. Restricting the ability to access and record facts disables one from later speaking and disseminating information about those facts. The Sorrell Court noted that “[f]acts, after
all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is most essential to
advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs.” 188 It follows that
laws burdening the underlying inputs of speech implicate the First Amendment.
If scraping qualifies as speech, it would likely be considered conduct “incidental to, or in preparation for, speech” under the First Amendment. 189 For
instance, some argue that video recording is a form of expression covered by
the First Amendment because it is conduct essential to speech. 190 In ACLU of
Illinois v. Alvarez, the Seventh Circuit recognized a right to record in enjoining
the enforcement of an Illinois all-party-consent wiretap statute. 191 There, the
court held that “[c]riminalizing all nonconsensual audio recording necessarily
limits the information that might later be published or broadcast . . . and thus
burdens First Amendment rights.”192 The right to create the recording, the
court reasoned, is “necessarily included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the
resulting recording.” 193
This reasoning may also extend to data scraping. As in Alvarez, limiting
scraping “necessarily limits the information that might later be published or
broadcast,” and thus burdens First Amendment rights. 194 In Sandvig v. Sessions, a case involving data scraping of a publicly available website, the court

186. See, e.g., Jameel Jaffer & Ramya Krishnan, Clearview AI’s First Amendment Theory
Threatens Privacy—and Free Speech, Too, SLATE (Nov. 17, 2020, 1:21 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/11/clearview-ai-first-amendment-illinois-lawsuit.html [perma.cc/7K94-7TSV] (discussing Clearview AI’s argument that its scraping practices are protected by the First
Amendment because it merely collects publicly available information).
187. 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011).
188. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570.
189. Carrero, supra note 11, at 152.
190. Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video Age, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1017 (2016).
191. 679 F.3d 583, 586–87, 595–97 (7th Cir. 2012).
192. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 597.
193. Id. at 595.
194. Id. at 597. For discussion of the First Amendment, the right to record, and data scraping, see Komal S. Patel, Note, Testing the Limits of the First Amendment: How Online Civil Rights
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observed that “even if a law says nothing about speech on its face, it is subject
to First Amendment scrutiny if it restricts access to traditional public fora.” 195
There, because the statute at issue “limit[ed] access to and burden[ed] speech
in the public forum that is the public Internet,” heightened First Amendment
scrutiny was appropriate. 196
The question, then, is whether this Note’s proposed limitations on data
scraping would survive First Amendment scrutiny. To reiterate, this Note’s
reform would limit scraping of personal information in bulk for predominantly commercial purposes. Where commercial speech is involved, courts
apply intermediate scrutiny: the state’s restriction on commercial speech must
directly advance a substantial governmental interest and must be drawn to
achieve that interest. 197
First, in limiting how corporations collect and monetize consumers’ personal information, governments like California’s have a “substantial interest”
in promoting consumer data privacy. 198 Indeed, the California Constitution
expressly makes privacy an “inalienable” right of all people. 199 And as the Supreme Court has recognized, the fact that “an event is not wholly ‘private’ does
not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information.”200 The existence of a modern technological tool
like scraping “only heightens the consequences of disclosure—‘in today’s society the computer can accumulate and store information that would otherwise have surely been forgotten.’ ” 201 Here, scraping poses a substantial threat
to individuals’ privacy, especially in cases where their personal information
has been made public without their knowledge or consent. 202 It allows data
that individuals may intend to restrict to instead be continuously collected and
shared outside their control.

Testing is Protected Speech Activity, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1485–91 (2018), and Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014).
195. 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573
U.S. 464, 476 (2014)).
196. Sandvig, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 29.
197. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571–72 (2011); see also Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 & n.8 (1985); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561, 563 (1980).
198. See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Commission found that the government has a substantial interest in protecting private credit information . . . .”); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 555 F.3d 996,
1001 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“ ‘[P]rotecting the privacy of consumer credit information’ is a ‘substantial’ governmental interest . . . .” (quoting Trans Union, 245 F.3d at 818)); see also King v. Gen.
Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303, 310 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
199. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
200. U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 770 (1989).
201. See Detroit Free Press Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 829 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2016) (en
banc) (quoting Reps. Comm., 489 U.S. at 771).
202. See supra Section II.A.
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Second, California also has a substantial interest in protecting its residents’ First Amendment interests—namely, free expression that relies on privacy. In her concurrence in United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor noted
that even where personal information is publicly available, its collection and
compilation can reveal a “comprehensive record” of a person’s activity that
reflects “a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations.”203 Data scraping could be viewed “as such an egregious invasion of privacy that users’ First Amendment activity on online platforms would be chilled.” 204 Fear that all of an individual’s personal information
is susceptible to scraping and misappropriation could curb the use of certain
internet platforms. Fear or suspicion that one’s speech is constantly monitored
“can have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and
constructive ideas.” 205 Finally, California has a substantial interest in protecting the integrity of its elections. As exposed by the malfeasance of Aggregate
IQ and Cambridge Analytica, data scraping has the potential to undermine
elections by scraping individuals’ social media profile information and serving
them targeted ads meant to influence their vote. 206
The statutory reform proposed in this Note—limiting the bulk collection
of publicly available personal information for commercial purposes—is narrowly drawn to meet California’s interests and thus should pass First Amendment scrutiny. The Constitution affords lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. 207 This reform
does not prohibit all access to publicly available information; it merely restricts its collection in bulk and for commercial purposes when it involves personal information that cannot be anonymized.
Indeed, there are provisions of California’s current privacy laws that arguably infringe on First Amendment rights far more than this Note’s proposal. 208 In the context of government collection of personal information for
criminal investigation purposes, the Supreme Court has held that “a person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties.” 209 But, as this Note explains, information is often publicized without any voluntary action or consent from the data subject. And

203. 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
204. Carrero, supra note 11, at 158.
205. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001).
206. See supra Section II.A for a discussion of Aggregate IQ and Cambridge Analytica.
207. KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 95-815, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14 (2014).
208. For instance, the CPRA gives consumers the right to request that a business delete any
personal information it has collected from and about the consumer or to correct inaccurate information about the consumer. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.105(a), .106(a) (West Supp. 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023). Compelling speech in this manner—deleting information and correcting
inaccurate information—arguably infringes upon the First Amendment more than restricting
bulk, commercial scraping activity in the manner I’ve proposed would.
209. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); see also United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
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this Note’s proposed reform does not restrict collecting single individuals’ information, but rather data in bulk. Most importantly, it also exempts from its
restrictions data collected for journalistic purposes or to address matters of
public concern. Criminal investigations would surely qualify for this exemption. The statutory language suggested in this Note likely comports with the
Supreme Court’s view of privacy and does not regulate beyond what is necessary to meet California’s interests. Accordingly, it should survive any challenges sounding in the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Data scraping can be greatly beneficial, but it presents serious concerns
when the data contains individuals’ personal information. As the author of
this Note, I am grateful for data-scraping technology because it made this
Note possible. After all, the research tools I used aggregate publicly available
information in the form of statutes, cases, and law review articles. But when
the information collected is not a judicial opinion but an individual’s personal
data, more is at stake. Scraping of such data in bulk can harm individual privacy, undermine democracy, and potentially even physically endanger us. Today’s privacy statutes do not do enough to address this issue, allowing
businesses to scrape and repurpose our personal information with near impunity. California should adopt a new approach that restricts the collection of
even publicly available personal information, only allowing such collection
when it deems it fair and permissible. Other states—and perhaps the federal
government—should soon follow suit.

